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Abstract
The law and economics literature on suit and settlement has tended
to focus on two alternative conceptual models. On the one hand, the
“optimism” model of pre-trial negotiation attempts to explain settlment
failure as an artifact of unfounded optimisim by one or both parties. The
idea that bargaining agents can adopt such non-rational biases receives
support from experimental evidence. On the other hand, the “private
information” model of pre-trial bargaining portrays settlement failures as
an artifact of strategic information rent extraction. It Þnds support in
some experimental evidence as well. This paper presents (for the Þrst
time) a mechanism-design approach for studying suit and settlement in
the presence of both optimism and two-sided private information. We
use a parameterization of our framework to generate testable comparative statics that distinguish between the two competing models, and then
test these predictions using data from civil jury trials before and after the
limitation on non-economic medical malpractice damages introduced by
California legislation during the 1970s. Our (preliminary) results appear
to be most consistent with the optimism model rather than the information model.
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Introduction

Although litigation steals the lion’s share of public attention within the civil
justice system, settlement is (and always has been) one of the most important
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phenomena in civil litigation. Indeed, by recent estimates, more than ninety-Þve
percent of all civil disputes settle before seeing their full blown day in court.1
The role, therefore, that settlement plays in the overall administration of civil
liability systems is signiÞcant, growing, and critical for ongoing policy debates.
Moreover, any attempt to study and interpret the law as it is reßected in litigated
cases must remain mindful of the selection processes that generate litigation in
the Þrst place.
Nevertheless, the existing theoretical and empirical literature on settlement
is relatively ununiÞed, due in large part to what have emerged as two competing theories of why cases settle — or perhaps more correctly, fail to do so. One
signiÞcant branch of the literature (e.g., Priest & Klein (1985)) employs what
has become known as an “optimism” model of bargaining to explain litigation,
in which certain litigants fail to settle disputes because they are unjustiÞably
sanguine about their prospects in court. If the parties’ relative degrees of optimism are suﬃciently severe, this theory posits, the plausible range of mutuallybeneÞcial settlements shrinks to nothing, and the case will go to court. A
litigation model built on an optimism framework is thought to predict that
tried cases will result in plaintiﬀ victories around Þfty percent of the time, although though recent work (e.g., Eisenberg & Farber (1997); Klerman (2001);
Siegelman & Waldfogel (1999)) demonstrates that this prediction rests on some
special distributional assumptions as well as assumptions about the relative
stakes involved. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the precariousness of the 50%
hypothesis, the Priest/Klein model has been a favored framework for empirical
testing, and in fact draws some descriptive support from experimental research
demonstrating that litigants (and even their attorneys) tend to skew the facts
in their favor (Babcock et al. (1995, 1997); Babcock & Loewenstein (1997)).
An alternative strand within the literature, however, portrays litigation not
as an artifact of cognitive bias toward optimism, but rather as a signal of private information. Under this approach (see, e.g., Bebchuk (1984); Reinganum
& Wilde (1986)), plaintiﬀs and defendants have private information about some
important element of their case (such as liability or damages), and this information is unobservable to the other side, and only veriÞable in court. Demonstrating a willingness to litigate, under this approach, is the only way to signal
that one’s case is relatively strong. (See, e.g., Spier 1992). Under this theory,
plaintiﬀs may prevail with virtually any probability (Shavell 1996).
Both of these approaches to settlement have garnered signiÞcant attention
among law and economics scholars. However, they have (for the most part)
remained largely segregated from one another; there is currently very little
work that explicitly attempts to unify these two approaches in a single, general,
and empirically testable model of bargaining (with the exceptions of Farmer &
Pecorino (2003) and Waldfogel (1998) discussed below). Perhaps this absence
of work is due, at least in part, to the fact that – outside of certain special
contexts – settlements are typically private agreements, not readily observable
to outsiders (and even pro-actively protected by the settling parties). As such,
1 See

Kakkalik et al (1990).
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most attempts to study suit and settlement concentrate on the special context,
such as class actions, publicized settlements in sports arbitration, or historical
civil procedures in which settlement and verdicts are both observable.2 None
of these settings, however, is particularly germane to the vast majority of civil
litigation that occurs in today’s courtrooms.
This paper attempts to Þll that partial void in two ways. First, we generalize
the existing theoretical framework for generating predictions about litigation
selection eﬀects that incorporates both the optimism and information model of
settlement. Instead of positing a stylized, extensive form game bargaining game
(as do Waldfogel (1998) and Farmer & Pecorino (2002, 2003)), we instead focus
broadly on the set of bargaining outcomes that can be supported with direct
revelation mechanisms, and more speciÞcally on optimal bargaining mechanisms
(which may mutate along with the underlying legal rule). Our approach is
therefore capable of capturing a much more general set of contexts, where private
information can be two sided (rather than one sided) and cognitive biases can
take on many forms (such as additive, multiplicative, and so forth).
Second, we use a parameterization of this approach to generate speciÞc comparative statics about how litigated cases will change after a shock to the underlying legal doctrine at play. We then use this predictive theory to inform
hypotheses that we test using a large data set of jury trials occurring in San Francisco County, CA and Cook County, IL between 1960 and 1999. In particular,
we test the optimism model against the information model by examining how
noneconomic damage caps imposed on medical malpractice cases in California in
1975 aﬀected the win rates of plaintiﬀs who litigated after the enactment of the
cap. Using diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates and utilizing three separate controls (non-medical malpractice cases in San Francisco and medical malpractice
and non-medical malpractice cases from Cook County), we Þnd (preliminary)
evidence that is consistent with the optimism model. SpeciÞcally, our results
fail to reject the hypothesis that the optimism model best describes pre-trial
settlement behavior.
To date, there is (to our knowledge) only one previous attempt to combine
both optimism and information asymmetries in a uniÞed theoretical account pretrial bargaining. Farmer and Pecorino (2003) add optimism to a take-it-or-leave
it pretrial bargaining model of Bebchuk (1984) to assess whether such biases
are beneÞcial. Their approach, however, is limited to bargaining problems
with (1) one-sided information asymmetries (2) about the probability of legal
liability, within (3) a simple take-it-or-leave-it bargaining framework. This
paper extends and generalizes their analysis to direct revelation mechanisms
under two-sided asymmetric information. While many of their results are robust
to an environment with an optimal bargaining mechanism, some are not.
From an empirical perspective, our approach is perhaps most akin to Waldfogel (1998), who attempts to distinguish between the information and optimism models using data from litigated cases in federal court, and Þnds evidence
2 One exception to this is Sieg (2000) who estimates a one-sided asymmetric information
game using closed claim data on medical malpractice cases in Florida.
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consistent with ours. Waldfogel’s approach, however, depends on predicting
aggregate win rates of cases based on a relatively stylized bargaining model of
one sided asymmetric information and additive biases. It is therefore not likely
to be robust to variations in the theoretical framework that generates those predictions.3 Our approach, in contrast, attempts to estimate a parameterization
of a much more general model, which in turn allows us to be more conÞdent
about the our theoretical predictions. In addition, rather than relying on aggregate levels of plaintiﬀ win rates to test the competing models, we instead focus
on measuring the eﬀects of a perturbation to the legal system that would change
the characteristics of litigated cases in alternative directions. This allows us to
avoid hinging our conclusions on aggregate win rates, which are themselves inherently indeterminate and unreliable in either the optimism or the information
model.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Section 2 of the paper presents a general
framework for studying suit and settlement in a mechanism design framework.
We characterize the qualities of an incentive compatible, individually rational
bargaining mechanism when parties possess both private information and optimistic biases. We then characterize an optimal bargaining mechanism within
that framework. Section 3 studies a plausible parameterization of the general
model in order to generate testable comparative statics on plaintiﬀ win rates
when shocks occur to various observable parameters. Section 4 then uses these
predictions to test between the information and the optimism model by focusing on the advent of the MICRA legislation in California. As noted above, we
Þnd (preliminarily) that the eﬀects on plaintiﬀ win rates are more consistent
with the optimism model than they are with the information model. Section 5
concludes.

2

A Mechanism-Design Approach to Settlement

In this section, we develop and then study a framework for analyzing settlement
through the lens of a direct revelation mechanism. Unlike previous studies,
however (e.g., Stole (1992); Spier (1994); Talley (1995)), we augment the traditional mechanism design approach — which usually assumes only information
asymmetry — with the possibility of cognitive bias.

2.1

Framework

Consider a plaintiﬀ (denoted π) and a defendant (denoted ∆) who are contemplating litigation over civil law dispute, such as a medical malpractice claim.
3 For example, Waldfogel posits a bargaining game in which defendants alone possess private
information about the likelihood of liability. This leads him to predict that the information
model would yield plaintiﬀ win rates far below 50%. If, however, one ßips the model to assume
that it is the plaintiﬀ who possesses private information, his prediction would reverse itself.
If both possess private information, Waldfogel’s approach yields no prediction whatsoever.
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Both parties — or at least their lawyers who control bargaining4 — are assumed
for simplicity to be risk neutral, and the costs of litigating (rather than settling)
are assumed exogenous, and given by cπ and c∆ , respectively. Within this
setting, the bargaining behavior of each side may turn on private information,
cognitive bias, or possibly both, as described below.
Consider Þrst the possibility that each party may potentially possess private
information about the expected judgment should the case go to trial. We assume
that the expected judgment to be given by J (x, y, z) , where x and y denote the
plaintiﬀ’s and defendant’s private information, respectively, about their side
of the case, and z represents a vector of doctrinal parameters and publicly
observable characteristics. We shall assume that J1 (x, y, z) > 0, J11 (x, y, z) ≥
0, J2 (x, y, z) < 0, and J22 (x, y, z) ≤ 0, so that a high value of x or y is
tantamount to having an objectively ‘strong’ case (from each side’s alternative
perspective).5 We assume that x is distributed according to a commonly-known
CDF F (x) with strictly positive density f (x) over the interval X ≡ [x, x] , and
similarly that y is distributed according to a commonly-known
CDF G (y) with
£ ¤
strictly positive density g (y) over the interval Y ≡ y, y . The distributions of
F (x) and G (y) are assumed independent, and F (.) /f (.) and G (.) /g (.) are
assumed strictly increasing over X and Y, respectively. (In the limiting case
where private information is no longer at issue, these distributions collapse to a
single mass point).
In addition to the information component outlined above, we also assume
that each of the parties possibly harbors a bias about her expectations of the
case. In particular, the plaintiﬀ’s subjective expectation of the Þnal judgment
for any given pair of information values (x, y) and observable environmental parameters z is J (x, y, z) + επ (x, y, z) , where επ (x, y, z) represents the plaintiﬀ’s
bias about the case. If επ (.) > 0, the plaintiﬀ harbors a self-serving bias; if
επ (.) = 0, the plaintiﬀ is unbiased. (We restrict attention to non-negative bias
in light of the relatively strong experimental results on the issue6 ). Although
the plaintiﬀ’s bias may be increasing or decreasing in her type, we assume that
∂επ
∂J
∂x > − ∂x , so as to rule out the perverse case where the plaintiﬀ’s perceived
judgment is actually decreasing in the strength of her case. Similarly, the defendant’s subjective expectation of the Þnal judgment for any given (x, y) and
observables z is J (x, y, z) − ε∆ (x, y, z) ,where ε∆ (x, y, z) represents the defendant’s bias about the case. If ε∆ (.) > 0, the defendant is optimistic; if ε∆ (.) = 0,
∂J
∆
the defendant is unbiased. We similarly assume here that ∂ε
∂y < − ∂y , again to
rule out the possibility that the defendant’s perceived judgement is decreasing
4 Our paper does not explore any agency cost between the attorney and the client. While
that is certainly worth study, our focus is on asking whether the information or optimism
outcome can better explain the characteristics of litigation. We have no clear priors on how
such an agency cost (or lack thereof) between the attorney and client would aﬀect the answer
to our question.
5 The cross-partial J
12 (.) could be either positive or negative without aﬀecting our general
results. However, in a later parameterization of the model for testing, we will restrict attention
to judgment functions such that |J12 | is suﬃciently “small.”
6 See, e.g., Babcock et al. (1997); Babcock et al. (1997).
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in her type.7 (For notational ease, we suppress z in the theoretical discussion
below, rescussitating it again in the empirical section of the paper). To distinguish the eﬀect of bias from that of private information, we assume that the
structure of the bias functions, επ (x, y) and ε∆ (x, y) , is common knowledge
before bargaining commences.8

2.2

Reservation Utilities

Under the above speciÞcations, it is possible to describe the expected payoﬀs
that the parties would receive in the absence of bargaining. The plaintiﬀ’s
reservation payoﬀ is given by:
Ey [J (x, y) + επ (x, y) − cπ ]

(1)

The defendant’s reservation payoﬀ is given by:
Ex [−J (x, y) + ε∆ (x, y) − c∆ ]

(2)

Thus, if pre-trial negotiation is to be individually rational for these players, it
had better produce an expected payoﬀ for each that exceeds those given in the
above expressions. We shall also assume that J (x, y) − cπ ≥ 0, and thus suit is
always credible, even when the weakest, unbiased plaintiﬀ comes up against the
strongest defendant. (In later drafts of this paper, we will explore implications
of relaxing this assumption).

2.3

Settlement Mechanism

Given the underlying structure of the litigation game, the revelation principle is
clearly applicable, and thus the outcome of any extensive form bargaining game
can be represented through a direct revelation mechanism. Consider, therefore,
a bargaining mechanism of the form {p (ξ, θ) , t (ξ, θ)} , where:
• ξ and θ represent the reported types of the plaintiﬀ (whose true type is x)
and the defendant (whose true type is y), respectively;
• p (., .) denotes the probability of settlement (and thus (1 − p (., .)) denotes
the probability of trial); and
• t (., .) denotes the settlement payment made by defendant to plaintiﬀ when
a settlement occurs.
2

2

επ (x)
ε∆ (y)
also assume that ∂ ∂y
≥ 0, ∂ ∂y
≥ 0, and that the cross partials of both are
2
2
relatively “small.”
8 Note that the functional form of the bias is deliberately kept as general as possible. This
generality allows for numerous functional forms. For example, the bias function could be a
simple additive or multiplicative transformation of the judgment function; or alternatively, it
could be speciÞed as a type of “coding error” that occurs when the parties attempt to perceive
their private information.
7 We
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Under such a mechanism, we Þrst derive the parties’ respective net gains
from participating, over and above their reservation utilities. For the plaintiﬀ
whose type is x but who reports ξ, the expected net gain from participation is9 :
rπ (ξ|x) = Ey {p (ξ, y) t (ξ, y) + (1 − p (ξ, y)) (J (x, y) + επ (x, y) − cπ )}
{z
}
|
Gross Payoﬀ

−Ey {J (x, y) + επ (x, y) − cπ }
{z
}
|

(3)

Reservation Payoﬀ

Similarly, for the defendant whose type is y but who reports θ, the expected
net gain from participation is:
r∆ (θ|y) = Ex {−p (x, θ) t (x, θ) − (1 − p (x, θ)) (J (x, y) − ε∆ (x, y) + c∆ )}
(4)
+Ex {J (x, y) − ε∆ (x, y) + c∆ }
If the parties report their information truthfully (that is, ξ = x and θ = y),
then the above expressions simplify to read:
rπ (x|x) = Ey {p (x, y) t (x, y)} − Ey {p (x, y) (J (x, y) + ε∆ (x, y) − cπ )} (5)
r∆ (y|y) = −Ex {p (x, y) t (x, y)} + Ex {p (x, y) (J (x, y) − ε∆ (x, y) + c∆ )}
(In what follows we will slightly abuse notation and use rπ (x) and r∆ (y) to
denote rπ (x|x) and r∆ (y|y) , respectively). Consequently, under truth telling,
the expected sum of the parties’ perceived ex ante gains from settlement is:





S1 = Exy {rπ (x) + r∆ (y)} = Ex,y p (x, y)  (cπ + c∆ ) − (επ (x, y) + ε∆ (x, y))

{z
} 
| {z } |
Costs Saved

Bias Premium Lost

(6)
Note that the above sum incorporates within it the parties’ biases about their
expected judgment. If this bias is an artifact of transitory (or “hot”) preferences, then it may be misleading to characterize the above expression as an
appropriate measure of social surplus. In particular, a social planner might
prefer to maximize a “paternalistic” social welfare function, consisting of the
parties’ actual (rather than perceived) ex ante gains from settlement, or:




©
ª
S2 = Exy rπ (x) + r∆ (y) |επ (.) = ε∆ (.) = 0 = Ex,y p (x, y) · (cπ + c∆ )

| {z } 
Costs Saved

(7)
The two above expressions are similar in that they the fact that settlement
saves the parties the joint litigation costs they would otherwise have to expend
in litigation. Nevertheless, there is an extra term in (6) representing an expected
9 These

expressions are derived formally in the appendix.
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loss that bargaining visits on parties who (irrationally) envision a more generous
litigation outcome than they will actually receive.
Because our chief enterprise is to explore the characteristics of an “optimal”
mechanism, a well-speciÞed problem requires that we commit to some measure
of total surplus. Rather than gravitating to one of the above two formulations,
we shall simply assume that an optimal mechanism attempts to maximize some
convex combination of the two above measures, or γS1 + (1 − γ) S2 , where γ ∈
[0, 1] denotes a free parameter that measures the amount of deference that the
optimal bargaining mechanism gives to the parties’ cognitive biases. In practice,
γ might reßect any number of considerations. For instance, it might (as alluded
to above) designate the weight that a benevolent social planner would place on
gratifying the parties’ temporary biases. More concretely, γ might capture the
extent to which the overall structure of the legal system (such as professional
attorneys and procedural rules) acts to ‘de-bias’ the litigants, inducing them
to accept a bargaining procedure that comes closer to maximizing the clients’
actual (rather than perceived) joint welfare.10
Given this deÞnition of optimality, we study the characteristics of the mechanism that maximizes this measure of surplus, subject to “incentive compatibility” constraints (i.e., that the parties truthfully reveal their types) and “individual rationality” constraints (i.e., that parties expect to receive at least their
perceived reservation values under the mechanism). Consequently, we posit the
following maximization problem for the mechanism designer:
M ax{p,t} Ex,y {p (x, y) [(cπ + c∆ ) − γ (επ (x, y) + ε∆ (x, y))]}
subject to
(ICπ ) x ∈ arg maxξ {rπ (ξ|x)} ;
(IC∆ ) y ∈ arg maxθ {r∆ (θ|y)} ;
(IRπ ) rπ (x) ≥ 0;
(IR∆ ) r∆ (y) ≥ 0.
2.3.1

(*)

Incentive compatibility

As a starting point for studying this problem, consider Þrst what restrictions
incentive compatibility imposes. Using a relatively standard approach from the
literature,11 and assuming that the rent functions are almost always continuously diﬀerentiable, the following lemma follows (whose proof is omitted):
Lemma 1: A bargaining mechanism (p, t) is incentive compatible for π and ∆
1 0 There is some evidence that attorneys can play this role. While still possibly somewhat
subject to self-serving biases, attorneys are paid to anticipate counterarguments of the other
side. In experimental settings at least, it has been shown that being forced to articulate such
counterarguments has a debiasing eﬀect. See, e.g., Babcock & Loewenstein (1997).
1 1 See, e.g., Guesnerie & Laﬀont (1984).
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if and only if the following conditions hold:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

rπ0 (x) = −Ey {p (x, y) · (J1 (x, y) + επ1 (x, y))} < 0
0
(y) = −Ex {p (x, y) · (−J2 (x, y) + ε∆2 (x, y))} < 0
r∆
Ey {p1 (x, y) · (J1 (x, y) + επ1 (x, y))} ≤ 0
Ex {p2 (x, y) · (−J2 (x, y) + ε∆2 (x, y))} ≤ 0

The four conditions above consist of Þrst order “envelope” conditions ((a)
and (b)) and second order “monotonicity” conditions ((c) and (d)), and are
common in the literature.12 Note from the envelope conditions that expected
information rents of both parties are strictly decreasing in their types. This is
consistent with one’s intuition that, since it is the litigants with the weak cases
who have the greatest incentive (and ability) to misrepresent their types. The
monotonicity conditions ensure that
2.3.2

Individual Rationality:

Constraining ourselves to incentive compatible mechanisms (as characterized
above), consider now the role played by individual rationality: that is, what incentive compatible mechanisms also induce self-interested parties to participate
in the mechanism? As noted above, the parties’ information rents are decreasing in their types, so that the strong plaintiﬀ (x = x) and the strong defendant
(y = y) are the ones who have the least to gain from settlement.
Integrating out the plaintiﬀ’s and defendant’s Þrst order conditions from
these “minimum rent” types of plaintiﬀ and defendant yields the following alternative set of expressions for rπ (x) and r∆ (y) :
Z x
rπ (x) = rπ (x) +
Ey {p (ξ, y) · (J1 (x, y) + επ1 (x, y))} · dξ
(8)
x

r∆ (y) = r∆ (y) +

Z

y
y

Ex {p (x, θ) · (−J2 (x, y) + ε∆2 (x, y))} dθ

(9)

Equating (8) and (9) to the deÞnitions of rπ (x) and r∆ (y) yields the following
lemma (whose proof is in the appendix).
Lemma 2: Consider a trading rule p : X × Y → [0, 1] . There exists a transfer
function t : X × Y → R+ such that (p, t) is incentive and compatible and
individually rational if and only if:
(a) Ey {p1 (x, y) · (J1 (x, y) + επ1 (x, y))} ≤ 0,
(b) Ex {p2 (x, y) · (−J2 (x, y) + ε∆2 (x, y))} ≤ 0, and
(c) Ex,y {p (x, y) · φ (x, y, cπ , c∆ )} ≥ 0, where
φ (.) = (cπ + c∆ ) − (επ (x, y) + ε∆ (x, y))
·
µ
µ
¶
¶¸
F (x)
G (y)
− (J1 (x, y) + επ1 (x, y))
+ (−J2 (x, y) + ε∆2 (x, y))
.
f (x)
g (y)
1 2 See,

e.g., Fudenberg & Tirole (1991).
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The procedure we shall follow to identify the optimal mechanism will solve a
‘relaxed’ problem in which constraints (a) and (b) are ignored, and the resulting
solution will be checked to verify that they are satisÞed.

2.4

Ex post eﬃciency

Before commencing with this endeavor, however, it is important to consider
whether “ex post” eﬃciency is attainable. An important observation with this
model is that, unlike in a pure asymmetric information model, with self serving
biases it may be optimal not to settle. In particular, when viewed from the
perspective of maximizing the parties’ perceived payoﬀs (i.e., γ = 1), litigation
turns out to be optimal for those values of x and y such that
cπ + c∆ < γ · (επ (x, y) + ε∆ (x, y))

(10)

in such situations, setting p (x, y) = 0 is Þrst-best eﬃcient.
However, when there are values of (x, y) such that (10) is not satisÞed, or
when adopting a more paternalistic setting (that is γ < 1), settlement becomes
more desirable. Here, the ex post eﬃcient mechanism would set the probability
of settlement so that:
½
1
if cπ + c∆ ≥ γ (επ (x, y) + ε∆ (x, y))
(11)
p (x, y) =
0
otherwise
Analysis of this rule leads to the following proposition (whose proof can be found
in the appendix):
Proposition 1: Ex post eﬃciency is attainable (if at all) under a direct revelation bargaining mechanism {p, t} under the following conditions:
∆
≤ inf {(επ (x, y) + ε∆ (x, y))} , ex post eﬃciency always pre1. If cπ +c
γ
scribes litigation, which is always attainable under a direct revelation
mechanism;
∆
< sup {επ (x, y) + ε∆ (x, y)} ,
2. If inf {επ (x, y) + ε∆ (x, y)} < cπ +c
γ
ex post eﬃciency prescribes settlement iﬀ επ (x, y) + ε∆ (x, y) <
cπ +c∆
, and is never attainable under a direct revelation mechanism;
γ
∆
3. If sup {επ (x, y) + ε∆ (x, y)} < cπ +c
, ex post eﬃciency prescribes
γ
p (x, y) = 1 ∀ (x, y), which is attainable under a direct revelation
mechanism only if cπ + c∆ is suﬃciently high.

The intuition that underlies Proposition 1 is relatively simple. It states that
the only circumstance in which ex post eﬃciency is always possible occurs when
the eﬀects of optimism become of Þrst order importance. In particular, when
cπ +c∆
≤ inf {επ (x, y) + ε∆ (x, y)} , optimism is so overpowering relative to litγ
igation costs that it is always socially optimal to bring suit. In this instance,
the null mechanism prescribing no settlement at all is universally incentive compatible and individually rational. In all other situations, ex post eﬃciency is
10

generally unattainable, except in the case where litigation costs grow so large
as to swamp the eﬀects of both optimism and information rent extraction. In
this situation, all cases will settle.
SigniÞcantly, the only two situations in which ex post eﬃciency is attainable
under a direct mechanism prescribe either universal litigation or universal settlement. Neither of these scenarios seems to be terribly plausible as an empirical
proposition, given the statistical fact that some disputes settle while some do
not. Consequently, we would posit that the lion’s share of disputes (and in
particular, the marginal dispute) likely reside within either case (2) from the
proposition above, or a version of case (3) where litigation costs are insuﬃciently
high to induce universal settlement. Either way, ex post eﬃciency would not
be feasible, which implies that we must consider the characteristics of incentive
eﬃcient mechanisms, to which we now turn.

2.5

Incentive (Interim) Eﬃciency

Assuming ex post eﬃciency is not feasible, then, our chief question becomes that
of deriving the characteristics of an optimal second best mechanism. The programing problem, then, is to maximize expected surplus γS1 +(1 − γ) S2 , subject
to the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints identiÞed
above. As noted in Lemma 2 above, the optimization problem posited above
can now be simpliÞed as the following “relaxed” problem.13
M axp(x,y) Ex,y {p (x, y) ((cπ + c∆ ) − γ (επ (x, y) + ε∆ (x, y)))}
subject to
Ex,y {p (x, y) · φ (x, y, cπ , c∆ )} ≥ 0

(**)

Analysis of this program leads to the following proposition (whose proof can be
found in the appendix).
Proposition 2: There exists a unique scalar multiplier λ > 0 such that the
solution to the optimal settlement mechanism program (**) consists of a
settlement function p∗ (x, y) and transfer function t∗ (x, y) such that:

1 ⇔ cπ + c∆ ≥ (γ+λ)

(1+λ) (επ (x, y) + ε∆ (x, y))

´
³


F (x)

λ
(J
(x,
y)
+
ε
(x,
y))
+
1
π
1
(1+λ)
f³(x)
´
p∗ (x, y) =
G(y)

λ

(−J
(x,
y)
+
ε
(x,
y))
+
2
∆

2
(1+λ)
g(y)


0 Otherwise

Moreover, this solution satisÞes monotonicity conditions (a) and (b) from
Lemma 2, and thus solves program (*) as well.

1 3 Remember, the solution of this problem does not automatically satisfy the rent monotonicity conditions in Lemma 1 (conditions (a) and (b) in Lemma 2). Thus we have to re-check
the relaxed problem to conÞrm it is the solution to the general problem.
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Proposition 2 states that settlement will occur only in those situations where
litigation costs are suﬃciently high to oﬀset the combined eﬀects of strategic
rent extraction by the parties and the eﬀect of bias on the parties behavior. In
particular, settlement fails (and suit occurs) in this model when and only when
the following condition holds:
0 <

(γ + λ)
(επ (x, y) + ε∆ (x, y))
(12)
(1 + λ)
|
{z
}
Bias Rents
µ
µ
µ
¶
¶¶
F (x)
G (y)
λ
+
(J1 (x, y) + επ1 (x, y))
+ (−J2 (x, y) + ε∆2 (x, y))
(1 + λ)
f (x)
g (y)
{z
}
|
Inform ation Rents

− (cπ + c∆ )
= ψ (x, y; γ, λ, cπ , c∆ )

(13)

A stylized, conceptual representation of this suit/settlement frontier appears
in the Þgure below. Notice that in the Þgure, litigation occurs for (x, y) pairs
that are the strongest — a feature that is typical in these sorts of models,14
since stronger parties Þnd it optimal to signal their strength by manifesting a
willingness to litigate. We will utilize this geometric relationship in testing the
models against one another in the empirical section below.

y
y–
Litigation
ψ(.) = ψ0
Settlement
y
x–

x

x

1 4 The downward sloping shape in frontier the Þgure generally obtains so long as the cross
partial J12 (x, y) does not take on values that are too extreme.
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Within this general setting, it is possible to glean some insight about how
shocks to the exogenous parameters (cπ , c∆ , γ) parameters might aﬀect the selection of cases for judgment. Inspection of expression (12) and the implicit
function theorem generate the following comparative statics on litigation rates—
that is Ex,y {1 − p (x, y)} :
• As total litigation costs increase, litigation rates decrease. Equivalently,
∂Ex,y {1−p(x,y)}
∂E {1−p(x,y)}
< 0 and x,y ∂c∆
< 0. This is an artifact of the fact
∂cπ
∂ψ
∂ψ
that ∂cπ < 0 and ∂c∆ < 0. This should not be surprising, since this comparative static holds for both the optimism and the information model.
Consequently, in the information model it means that progressively only
the stronger cases (on both sides) are selected for litigation as litigation
costs increase. In the optimism model it means that only litigants possessing more extreme types of cognitive bias are selected for trial.
• As lawyers increasingly mimic their client’s biases, litigation rates increase.
∂E {1−p(x,y)}
> 0. This is an artifact of the fact that ∂ψ
Equivalently, x,y ∂γ
∂γ >
0. Consequently, under an information model, as lawyers come to dampen
their clients’ preferences, only the stronger cases are selected for trial.
Note that under the ‘pure’ information based model (the εi (.)’s are both
zero), however, shocks to γ should have no aﬀect on litigation rates rates
(see our analysis below).
While comparative statics such as these are good for understanding the intuitions behind the model (and assessing its plausibility), they are not particularly
helpful for current purposes, as the jury verdicts data set we are interested in
testing contains only those cases that are actually litigated. Given this fact, it
is necessary to generate comparative statics not on settlement rates, but rather
on some observable aspects of Þnal judgments Equivalently, we are interested
in generating comparative statics on:
RR
ψ(x,y)>0 h (x, y) dF (x) dG (y)
Ex,y {h (x, y) |p (x, y) = 0} =
Ex,y {1 − p∗ (x, y)}
where h (x, y) is some function of interest (like plaintiﬀ win outcomes, damages
amounts, etc.) which is observable in the data. To generate such comparative
statics, it will be necessary to add additional structure to the model by assuming
greater structure to the model. It is to this task that we turn in the next section.

3

Testable Parameterization

As noted above, in order to test the information model against the optimism
model in our data set, we must add additional structure to the substantive and
distributional parameters posited above. In this section, therefore, we consider
a speciÞcation of the general framework above in order to generate testable
comparative statics. In so doing, it is clearly important for us to exercise
13

some caution: for any parameterization must (if it is to produce meaningful
predictions) accord with one’s intuitions and existing experimental evidence
about how both information and self serving biases are likely to enter into
settlement negotiations. The analysis that follows reßects our eﬀort to provide
such a check while simultaneously adding some structure to our framework.
It can, therefore, be conceptualized at least as a starting point from which to
launch into our empirical investigation.
Consider a judgment function takes the following functional form:
J (x, y) = α · D (x) · ρ (y) + η

(14)

where α is a nonnegative parameter (discussed below), D (x) represents expected damages conditional on liability, ρ (y) represents the probability that
the defendant will be found liable, and η represents an error term with mean
zero that is distributed independent of either x or y. We assume that D0 (x) > 0
and ρ0 (y) < 0. This speciÞcation captures a generalization of what is perhaps
the most commonly modeled litigation environment in the bargaining literature,
where defendants are in a better position to know of their previously negligent
acts, while plaintiﬀs are in a better position to know the harm they have suffered (e.g., Reinganum & Wilde (1986); Bebchuk (1984); Spier (1992); Farmer
& Pecorino (2003)).15
In addition to this possible information asymmetry, suppose that each party
is subject to additive optimism in the form επ (x, y) = επ for the plaintiﬀ and
ε∆ (x, y) = ε∆ for the defendant, where επ and ε∆ are both nonnegative. Suppose further that επ and ε∆ are distributed independently of one another according to distribution functions Hπ (eπ ) and H∆ (e∆ ), with respective means
of µπ and µ∆ .
Taking expectations of this function and applying Proposition 2, the probability of settlement under an optimal bargaining mechanism is:




if (cπ + c∆ ) ≥ (γ+λ)
(επ + ε∆ )
(1+λ)
³
´
´´
³
³
∗
F
(x)
λα
0
p (x, y, επ , ε∆ ) =
+ (1+λ) D (x) ρ (y) f (x) + −D (x) ρ0 (y) G(y)
g(y)


0
otherwise
(15)
Given this optimal settlement rule, we now compare the “pure information”
model to the “pure optimism” model in terms of their relative comparative
statics, focusing particularly on expected win rates of plaintiﬀs.
1

1 5 As above, we continue to suppose that α· D (x)·ρ (y) > c , so as to rule out the possibility
π
of non-credible suits in expected value.
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3.1

Pure information model

Consider Þrst the pure information version of the model, where επ and ε∆ are
constrained to be zero by hypothesis. Here, suit occurs whenever
µ
µ
µ
¶
¶¶
λ
F (x)
G (y)
(cπ + c∆ )
0
0
<
D (x) ρ (y)
+ −D (x) ρ (y)
(16)
α
(1 + λ)
f (x)
g (y)
Referring to Figure 1 above, under a regularity condition,16 the suit-settlement
frontier will be downward sloping in x − y space. Analysis of this frontier
permits us to generate the following predictions:
Prediction 3a: Under the pure information model, the plaintiﬀ’s expected win
rate, Ex,y {ρ (y) |p∗ = 0} , is strictly decreasing in cπ and c∆ , strictly increasing in α, and invariant in γ. The plaintiﬀ’s expected damage level conditional on liability, Ex,y {D (x) |p∗ = 0} , is strictly increasing in cπ , c∆ ,
strictly decreasing in α, and invariant in γ.
The intuition behind Prediction 3 is relatively straightforward. An increase
in the litigation costs of either party (i.e., cπ or c∆ ) makes bargaining more
attractive, and in so doing slackens the incentive compatibility constraints. This
causes the settlement frontier to move up and to the right, so the plaintiﬀ and
defendant types that continue to litigate are stronger on average than those who
would have been willing to litigate prior to the cost shock. Consequently, for
litigated cases the expected strength of both the defendant’s and the plaintiﬀ’s
case increases as well. This translates into a decreased likelihood of liability
and an increased level of expected damages.

3.2

Pure optimism model

Under the pure optimism model, information asymmetries are constrained to be
zero, and thus the distributions of x and y collapse to mass points at their true
value. Consequently, it must be that λ = 0, since the complete information
case means that the incentive compatibility constraint is no longer binding.
We therefore need only ensure that settlement is individually rational. From
15), a necessary condition (and, with appropriate transfers, a suﬃcient one) for
litigation to occur in the pure optimism model for a given (x, y) is:
(cπ + c∆ ) < γ (επ + ε∆ )

(17)

Note that this condition does not turn on the relative values of either x or y.
Consequently, the expected win rate and damages under the pure optimism
model should remain constant after a change in underlying parameters. This
intuition is formalized in the following Prediction:
Prediction 3b: Under the pure optimism model, both the plaintiﬀ’s expected
win rate, Ex,y {ρ (y) |p∗ = 0} , and the plaintiﬀ’s expected damages, Ex,y {D (x) |p∗ = 0} ,
are invariant to changes in cπ c∆ , α, and γ.
1 6 That

is that |D0 (x) ρ0 (y) | is suﬃciently small.
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3.3

Synthesis

A comparison of Predictions (3a) and (3b) yields the following tables of comparative statics on how shocks to various parameters are related to changes in
expected plaintiﬀ win rates:
Table 1: Liability (Comparative Statics on E (ρ (y)))
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂α
∂cπ or ∂c∆
∂γ
Pure Information Model (+)
(−)
0
Pure Optimism Model
0
0
0

Table 2: Damages (Comparative Statics on E (D (x)))
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂α
∂cπ or ∂c∆
∂γ
Pure Information Model (−)
(+)
0
Pure Optimism Model
0
0
0
Note that the pure information and the pure optimism models do not always
predict the comparative statics. In particular, the two models make opposite
predictions about how the expected values of ρ (y) and D (x) will react to a
shock in parameters α, cπ and c∆ . At the same time, the “pure” models both
predict that win rates and damages will be invariant to changes in γ.17 In the
following section, we will exploit these comparative statics to test between the
pure information and the pure optimism model as an explanatory model of
settlement.

4

Testing the Theory

In this section, we turn to a strategy for testing the above parameterization
of the model: using an exogenous shock to the legal environment to test the
comparative statics predictions given above. In particular, we consider the introduction of the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), a wellknown 1975 California statute,18 to test how plaintiﬀ win rates responded to a
shock in expected damage awards. The comparative statics presented in Table 1
above illustrate that the pure information model and the pure optimism model
provide distinct predictions about how the pool of cases that go before a jury
should change in response to certain parameters. Because, as we shall discuss,
MICRA only aﬀected medical malpractice cases in California, this statutory
shock provides a natural experiment worth exploring, with an eye toward comparing trends in plaintiﬀ win rates in medical malpractice cases in San Francisco
versus other cases in San Francisco, and versus similar cases in Cook County.
1 7 Interestingly, a combined version of this parameterization in which both information and
optimism are at play generates non-zero comparative statics for shocks to γ. We do not exploit
this fact in the current draft, however.
1 8 Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (1975) (codiÞed in scattered sections of Cal.
Civ. Code and Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code (2002)).
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Using these comparisons, it is possible to test whether the observed changes are
more consistent with the pure optimism model or the pure information model.19
MICRA was introduced in California in 1975. There were many components
to the legislation,20 but the main provision for our purposes – and the one that
received most attention at its passage – was a ceiling on noneconomic damage
awards (commonly referred to pain and suﬀering awards) in medical malpractice
verdicts equal to $250,000. This provision was codiÞed in section 3333.2 of the
California Civil Code, which reads (in relevant part):
§ 3333.2. Negligence of health care provider; noneconomic losses; limitation
(a) In any action for injury against a health care provider based
on professional negligence, the injured plaintiﬀ shall be entitled to recover noneconomic losses to compensate for pain, suﬀering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disÞgurement and other nonpecuniary
damage.
(b) In no action shall the amount of damages for noneconomic
losses exceed two hundred Þfty thousand dollars ($250,000).
According to the bill’s legislative history, the cap implemented by § 3333.2
was intended to help alleviate what was perceived at the time to be a crisis in the
medical industry in California due to escalating costs from medical malpractice
claims (see, e.g., Zeiler (2002)). Whether such a crisis indeed existed at the time
or not, the MICRA approach to capping pain and suﬀering awards is currently
being used as a model for the Bush Administration’s proposed federal ceiling
on noneconomic damage awards.
Relating this statutory change to the parameterization of our model developed in Section 3, we can capture the eﬀect of § 3333.2 by considering changes
in the judgment parameter α. In particular, suppose that the probability of
liability is given by ρ (y) , as before, and that damages are given by
Damages = α · D (x)

(18)

so that the judgment parameter α captures the extent to which the underlying
legal rule dampens or multiplies the plaintiﬀ’s “true” damages of D (x) . Viewed
in this sense, the introduction of § 3333.2 was tantamount to a reduction in the
value of α.21 While our data contains insuﬃcient information to pinpoint which
1 9 In this version of the paper, we do not ask whether a ‘combined’ model outperforms either
of the pure models. In later drafts, however, we hope to be able to generate some comparative
statics that might facilitate such a test.
2 0 For example, MICRA allowed doctors and patients to contract for binding arbitration,
allowed for admissibility of collateral source evidence (Cal. Civ. Code § 3333.1), limited
contingency fees (in a fashion that is strikingly at odds with conventional incentive theory)
(Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6146(a)), and permitted the payment of malpractice damages as
part of a periodic payment scheme (Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 667.7).
2 1 To be sure, this is but one interpretation of the eﬀect of MICRA. Another might be that
§ 3333.2 only had the eﬀect of dampening large damages, leaving smaller damages unaﬀected.
The comparative statics predictions would not be aﬀected by this alternative interpretation.
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verdicts would have been aﬀected by the MICRA cap, recent work by Pace
(2003) suggests that approximately 40% of malpractice awards in California
from 1995-1999 were ultimately aﬀected by the cap, as measured ex post.22
To the extent, however, that any case has at least some chance of collecting
extremely large non-economic damages, the eﬀect of MICRA seems likely to be
one of reducing expected damages across the board (though perhaps especially
so for large damages cases). This eﬀect, then, would lead us to predict (as
per Table 1) that under a pure information model, expected win rates should
decrease (all else held constant) after the introduction of MICRA. Under the
pure optimism model, however, we would predict no change in expected win rates
after MICRA.23
Given these predictions, the optimism model essentially serves as a null
hypothesis predicting no eﬀect on win rates against the alternative hypothesis
of a negative eﬀect under the information model. We use data on jury verdicts
from San Francisco and Cook county from 1960-1999 to test these hypotheses
using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator in a natural experiment framework.
Medical malpractice verdicts in San Francisco after the introduction of MICRA
provide us with a treatment group, while our control groups consist of (1) other
tort cases in San Francisco and (2) medical malpractice cases in Cook County,
IL; and (3) other tort cases in Cook County. In what follows, we describe the
data in more detail, outline our empirical strategy, present our results and brießy
discuss the power of our estimates given our sample size.

4.1

Data

Our data come from the RAND Jury Verdicts Database, which has collected information on nearly all civil jury verdicts in Cook County, IL and San Francisco
County, CA reported in the Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter of Chicago, IL
and Jury Verdicts Weekly of Santa Rosa, CA, respectively from 1960-1999. The
jury verdict reporters are regular publications that provide jurisdiction level information on jury verdicts as reported either by in-court witnesses or summaries
sent in by litigants, or both. The summaries in these reporters, intended primarily to be a source of information on the value of cases to potential litigants,
vary somewhat in the information provided but almost universally provide data
on key variables of interest. For our purposes the information the information
of primary importance are the case type (i.e. the issues litigated over in court)
and whether the jury ruled in favor of the plaintiﬀ or the defendant.
The data include information on 20,326 verdicts in San Francisco County
and Cook County from 1960-1999. However, we kept only verdicts involving
2 2 The cap has not been adjusted for inßation since its introduction, so we expect that it
aﬀects a larger fraction of cases today than it would have upon its induction.
2 3 Note that given this speciÞcation, the predicted eﬀect on observed damages would be
indeterminate. Explcitly, the predicted eﬀect would be:

∂Ex {D(x)}
∂E(Damages)
=α
+ Ex {D(x)}
∂α
∂α
whose sign is clearly ambiguous. We therefore concentrate our eﬀorts on plaintiﬀ win rates.
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tort cases and dropped 1,653 verdicts that involved issues of contract disputes
and Þnancial injury, because the reporting of these cases appear to have changed
over time, particularly in Cook County. The types of tort cases included as
“other cases” in our data include automobile, common carrier, products liability,
premises liability, intentional tort, other professional malpractice and other tort
liability cases. We also restrict our sample to only those verdicts in which a
single case type is reported, eliminating an additional 2,240 observations. Some
verdicts might report more than one case type, and it is possible that in some
of these cases medical malpractice might be an issue, but is such a minor issue
that MICRA would not be applicable (at least in a practical sense). The Þnal
data set we use, therefore, contains information on 16,433 verdicts.
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the data we use in our analysis. We
provide mean win rates for medical malpractice and other cases in San Francisco
and before and after the introduction of MICRA. Note that the MICRA damage
cap took eﬀect for injuries that occurred on or after December 12, 1975, so a
case is coded as being aﬀected by MICRA only if the incident being litigated
over is listed as being on or after that date.24
Table 3
Summary Statistics
San Francisco
Mean
St. Dev.
Pre-MICRA
Plaintiﬀ win rate: Malpractice
Plaintiﬀ win rate: Other
Malpractice Cases (%)
Number of Verdicts
Post-MICRA
Plaintiﬀ win rate: Malpractice
Plaintiﬀ win rate: Other
Malpractice Cases (%)
Number of Verdicts

Cook County
Mean
St. Dev.

31.48%
46.53
54.20%
49.83
8.10%
27.29
3, 333

33.96%
47.43
46.62%
49.89
4.46%
20.64
7, 131

32.74%
47.07
60.18%
48.98
12.95%
33.58
1, 298

35.81%
47.96
56.84%
49.54
29.12%
45.43
4, 671

Note from the table that plaintiﬀ win rates in medical malpractice are much
lower than that for other cases on average, as has been noted previously in Sieg
(2000). If one were attempting to test between the information and optimism
models by concentrating on win rates alone (e.g. Waldfogel (1998)), the table
might suggest that the relatively unbalanced win rate for malpractice cases
suggests that the information model was at play in those circumstances. As
noted above, however, analysis of aggregate win levels alone is not particularly
2 4 There were provisions of MICRA other than the damage cap, most notably the introduction of a sliding scale on attorney fees. The sliding scale aﬀected attorney-plaintiﬀ contracts
that were agreed upon before or after December 12, 1975. We have no information on the
attorney contracts, so it is possible some cases that involve injuries that occured before this
date but where a lawyer was not hired until after might be aﬀected by MICRA, at least to
the extent that attorneys inßuence the settlement decision.
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useful for testing the two models of settlement against one another, since under
either model, virtually any probability of liability is possible with appropriate
stakes and distributional assumptions.
Also worth noting is that the total number of verdicts in SF fell oﬀ sharply
after the passage of MICRA, although the number of medical malpractice verdicts fell by far less than the number of other tort verdicts. On the other hand,
the number of medical malpractice verdicts in CC grew substantially, while
the number of other verdicts fell somewhat. The possibility that other, nonobservable factors might have been aﬀecting the SF cases (or the CC cases, for
that matter) over this time is a factor that deserves attention in formulating
one’s empirical strategy. It is this question to which we now turn.

4.2

Empirical Strategy

As mentioned above, in our data we have one treatment group, medical malpractice verdicts in San Francisco after the passage of MICRA, and three potential
control groups, other verdicts in San Francisco (which were not aﬀected by the
passage of MICRA), medical malpractice verdicts in Cook County and other
verdicts in cook County. Using diﬀerent combinations of these controls we estimate three separate parameters that test for the presence of the information
model. Using diﬀerent control groups allows us to control for the possibility
of confounding trends that might have aﬀected other cases in San Francisco or
cases in Cook County.
Reviving the parametrization from Section 3, let ρ represent the probability
of a plaintiﬀ victory. In individual cases, we observe observe a realization of 1
if a jury Þnds for the plaintiﬀ and 0 otherwise, and we test for diﬀerences in the
predicted probability of a plaintiﬀ win using a linear probability model.25 The
Þrst parameter is the average diﬀerence in plaintiﬀ win rates between medical
malpractice and other verdicts in San Francisco before and after the implementation of MICRA. Formally we can deÞne this parameter as
¢ ¡
¢
¡
∂1 = ρm,sf,1 − ρo,sf,1 − ρm,sf,0 − ρo,sf,0

(19)

where ρi,j,t represents the average plaintiﬀ win rate for verdict type i in jurisdiction j in period t. Note that hereafter i equals m if a verdict is a medical
malpractice verdict and o if it is another tort verdict, j equals sf if the verdict
occurred in San Francisco and cc if it occurred in Cook County and t equals 1
if a verdict was subsequent to (and subject to) MICRA and 0 otherwise.
The second parameter we estimate is the diﬀerence in average plaintiﬀ win
rates for medical malpractice cases in San Francisco and Cook County before
and after the passage of MICRA, which we deÞne as

2 5 Our

¢ ¡
¢
¡
∂2 = ρm,sf,1 − ρm,cc,1 − ρm,sf,0 − ρo,cc,0 .

(20)

qualitative results do not change if we use a probit or a logit model. All standard
errors reported in the following section for the estimation results are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
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The third parameter that we estimate is a “diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences”
where we take the diﬀerence between medical malpractice and other verdicts in
San Francisco before and after MICRA and subtract the diﬀerence between medical malpractice and other verdicts in Cook County before and after MICRA.
This parameter is deÞned as
∂3

=

¢ ¡
¢¤
£¡
ρm,sf,1 − ρo,sf,1 − ρm,sf,0 − ρo,sf,0
¢ ¡
¢¤
£¡
− ρm,cc,1 − ρo,cc,1 − ρm,cc,0 − ρo,cc,0 .

(21)

Under the parameterization of the pure information model studied above,
all three parameters ∂1 , ∂2 and ∂3 should all be negative. MICRA only capped
awards for medical malpractice cases in San Francisco, so we would expect that
plaintiﬀ win rates for medical malpractice verdicts should fall relative to win
rates in other types of verdicts. Likewise, Cook County verdicts were unaﬀected,
so win rates in San Francisco should fall relative to both types of verdicts there
relative to Cook County. If the pure optimism model holds, then the estimated
parameters should be zero, and MICRA should have no eﬀect on win rates.26

4.3

Results

Table 4 presents our estimates of the eﬀect of MICRA on plaintiﬀ win rates.
The top section of the table presents the estimated coeﬃcients of ∂1 , ∂2 and ∂3
for the full sample of verdicts. The column labeled Control Group 1 presents the
estimated diﬀerence in diﬀerence between win rates in medical malpractice and
other verdicts in San Francisco before and after MICRA. The estimated value
of this parameter is −0.046, suggesting that – consistent with the information
model – plaintiﬀ win rates in medical malpractice verdicts fell relative to other
tort cases after the passage of MICRA. However, the standard error associated
with this parameter is suﬃciently large (with a value of 0.051) to render the
estimate statistically insigniÞcant.
The parameter for the second control group, comparing medical malpractice
verdicts in San Francisco to those in Cook County, is also negative. This suggests
that plaintiﬀ win rates in medical malpractice cases in San Francisco fell relative
to those in Cook County after the passage of MICRA; but once again, the
diﬀerence is not statistically signiÞcant.
The estimate using the third control group, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence-indiﬀerences estimate using diﬀerences in win rates between medical malpractice
and other verdicts in San Francisco and Cook County, is actually positive with
a value of 0.052, but as with the other estimates it is not statistically signiÞcant.

2 6 Again, note that in the very special case where κ ∈ (0, 1) MICRA will have a negative
eﬀect on win rates, and we would expect that ∂1 , ∂2 and ∂3 would be negative. However, we
only explicitly test the one-tailed hypothesis that the coeﬃcients are positive.
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Table 4
The Estimated Eﬀect of MICRA on Plaintiﬀ Win
Control Group 1: Control Group 2:
∂1
∂2
1960-1999
−0.046
−0.008
(0.051)
(0.055)
Number of Obs 4, 631
2, 116
1965-1985
−0.024
0.015
(0.076)
(0.096)
Number of Obs 2, 991
615
1970-1980
−0.035
0.103
(0.103)
(0.157)
Number of Obs 1, 675
371

Rates 27
Control Group 3:
∂3
0.052
(0.060)
16, 433
0.036
(0.101)
9, 888
0.051
(0.165)
5, 243

We now turn our attention to the bottom two parts of Table 4, which provide
estimates on restricted subsamples of verdicts. The availability of almost twenty
years of data before and after the passage of MICRA is convenient because it
provides relatively large sample sizes. However, the time frame is long enough
that it is worthwhile to estimate the parameters using data on verdicts closer to
the actual passage of the act. This allows us to check whether or not MICRA
might have had a stronger eﬀect closer to its original enactment, and helps to
avoid the possibility of contamination in the treatment or control groups by
other, unobserved factors that might have changed over time. For example, in
1987 the sliding scale on attorney fees was loosened somewhat.28 If attorneys
have the ability to inßuence the settlement process then this would mitigate
the eﬀects of MICRA and bias us towards Þnding no eﬀect in verdicts after the
reform.
The center portion of Table 4 presents the estimated coeﬃcients when the
sample is limited to those verdicts that occurred from 1965-1985, ten years before and ten years after the passage of MICRA. The third and Þnal portion of
the table limits the sample to Þve years before and Þve years after the passage
of MICRA. Inspection of the estimated coeﬃcient values on both of these populations show that limiting the data to these subsamples has very little eﬀect
on the results. In no cases are the estimated parameters statistically signiÞcant.
In the estimates using the Þrst and third control groups, corresponding to parameters ∂1 and ∂3 , the parameters have the same sign as and magnitudes similar
to their estimated values using the entire sample of verdicts. Only the value
2 7 Heteroskedsticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. A regressions are weighted
using to reßect that some cases have a diﬀerent probability of being selected. This sampling
reßects the fact that for automobile cases, which are a large fraction of tort cases, only one
out of every four (or one out of every Þve in some years) of these verdicts was included in the
data.
2 8 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6146(a).
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of ∂2 changes noticeably, becoming positive in both of the restricted samples
and with a (relatively large) point estimate of 0.103 in the 1970-1980 sample.
However, the sample sizes using the second control group are quite small, so the
resulting standard errors on these estimates are high.
The results presented in Table 4 demonstrate that the passage of MICRA had
no perceptible eﬀect on plaintiﬀ win rates in medical malpractice jury verdicts
in San Francisco. This result is robust to several diﬀerent control groups and is
consistent as we look at diﬀerent spans before and after the act’s passage.29 In
general, then, our results fail to provide any support for the information model
of pre-trial settlement behavior over the optimism model. Explicitly, we fail to
Þnd any signiÞcant eﬀect of MICRA on win rates, and thus we fail to reject
the null hypothesis that the optimism model best explains pre-trial settlement
behavior.

4.4

Robustness

At this juncture, it is worthwhile considering a few possible ways in which either our approach may be subject to criticism questioning whether our approach
genuinely provides support for the optimism model over the information model.
We consider three such criticisms, each in turn: (1) Insuﬃcient power in empirical tests; (2) MisspeciÞcation of the parameterized theoretical model; and (3)
Failure to account for ex ante behavioral adjustments in comparative statics.
4.4.1

Empirical Power

Whenever interpreting a failure to reject the null hypothesis it is important
to consider sample size and the power of one’s estimates. In order to address
these concerns, we brießy explore the extent to which our failure to detect any
statistically signiÞcant eﬀect of MICRA in the previous section can be explained
by insuﬃcient sample sizes. To see the importance of sample size, consider the
case of ∂1 , where we estimate the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences using the regression:
pi = a0 + a1 M edmali + a2 M ICRAi + ∂1 Medmal_MICRAi + ei

(22)

where pi is an indicator variable equalling 1 if the jury found for the plaintiﬀ
in verdict i, Medmal is an indicator variable for whether or not a verdict involved medical malpractice, M ICRA is an indicator variable for whether or not
incident leading to the litigation occurred after the eﬀective date of MICRA,
and M edmal_MICRA is the “treatment” variable that indicates whether or
2 9 An obvious strategy that is not discussed here is the inclusion of additional covariates
in the estimating equations reported in Table 3. In regressions not reported here, we included various additional explanatory variables including indicators for case type, measures
of reported economic losses, and indicators for litigant types (i.e. whether the plaintiﬀ or
defendant is an individual or a business or government agency), but none of these have any
aﬀect on the qualitative results of this section.
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not a verdict involved medical malpractice and an injury that occurred after
MICRA’s eﬀective date.30
In this example the t-statistic for the OLS estimate of ∂1 is given by
t=

∂ˆ1
√

σ̂e
N σ̂ 2∂ (1−R2∂ )

(23)

where σ̂e is the root mean square error of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences regression, N is the number of observations, σ̂ 2∂ is the sample variance of the variable
Medmal_M ICRA and R∂2 is the r-square of the regression of M edmal_MICRA
on Medmal and M ICRA. Recognizing the fact that our estimate ∂ˆ1 will only
be statistically signiÞcant at the 5% level if t is greater than 1.96, we can rearrange Equation 23 into the following expression for the minimum sample size
needed to obtain statistical signiÞcance
N>

(1.96)2 σ̂ 2e
.
∂ˆ12 σ̂2∂ (1 − R2∂ )

(24)

Equation 24 illustrates that the sample size we need is increasing in the
mean square error of the regression, but decreasing in the absolute value of
the parameter estimate, the sample variance of the treatment, and the portion
of variation in the treatment that is uncorrelated with the other explanatory
variables. Note that this equation can be easily adapted to apply to any of the
regressions used to produce the estimates in Table 4 above, so by Þlling in values
for the parameters we can estimate the sample size needed to Þnd support for
the information model.
Table 5 provides estimates of the sample sizes necessary to Þnd a signiÞcant diﬀerence coeﬃcient of at least 0.05 using each of the three control groups
estimated on the whole sample. Estimates of the parameters σ̂ 2∂ and R∂2 are
easily derived from the sample. The mean square error in the regressions used
to create Table 4 range from 0.227 0.246 so to be conservative we use 0.246
as our estimate of σ̂2e . The table provides the sample sizes necessary to obtain
signiÞcance at either the 5% or 10% level.31

Table 5
Minimum Sample Sizes Necessary for Statistical SigniÞcance
SigniÞcance Level Control Group 1: Control Group 2: Control Group 3:
∂1
∂2
∂3
5%
7, 731
10, 877
46, 598
10%
5, 445
7, 662
32, 824
Actual #
4, 631
2, 116
16, 433
3 0 This is the exact form of the regression that was used to provide the estimate of ∂
1
presented in Table 3.
3 1 The 10% critical value for the t-statistic used here is 1.645.
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The results of Table 5 suggest that a lack of power may explain at least part
of our failure to reject the optimism model. For none of the parameters do we
have enough observations to observe a statistically signiÞcant coeﬃcient value of
0.05 at even the 10% level. Our estimates of ∂1 appear to have the most power,
we could observe a statistically signiÞcant coeﬃcient at the 10% level if the
sample size included an additional 814 observations, an increase of about 17%.
To observe statistical signiÞcance at the 5% level, however, we would require a
much larger increase of 3,100, or about 67%. The power of our estimates for
∂2 and ∂3 is worse, requiring at least a doubling of the number observations
simply to observe signiÞcance at the 10% level. Because the restricted samples
in Table 4 have even fewer observations, those estimates have less power and
would require much greater increases in the number of observations to obtain
signiÞcance.
These calculations suggest that our failure to reject the optimism model
may, in part, be due to the relatively small size of our data set rather than a
failure of the information model. It is worth noting, however, that the only
parameter estimated in the full sample that has a numerically signiÞcant sign
consistent with the information model, parameter ∂1 , is also the one in which
the actual sample size is relatively close to the required sample size in the power
simulations. It nevertheless seems possible that an increase in our sample size
might provide more support for the information model than we are currently
Þnding.
4.4.2

Theoretical MisspeciÞcation

One possible concern with our Þndings is that we were estimating a special
case of our general model, and that other parameterizations would have given
rise to diﬀerent results. In particular, our parameterization presupposed that
the underlying information asymmetry was such that the defendant had private information about liability, and the plaintiﬀ had private information about
damages. Under diﬀerent parameterization, one might argue, possibly diﬀerent
(and even contradictory) comparative statics might obtain, thereby leading one
to question what our empirical tests were attempting to falsify.
While the misspeciÞcation concern is a legitimate one, we believe that there
are a number of responses to it that are relatively convincing. First of all, even
if the speciÞcation we posited did not capture all possible litigated cases, it is at
the very least a plausible one that probably captured at least some sorts of cases.
Given that the generality of the model requires some sort of parameterization
to conduct a meaningful econometric test, perhaps plausibility is as good a
criterion as any.
Second, the parameterization we considered could be changed without affecting the qualitative predictions. Indeed, a number of variations on our
parameterization (including multiplicative biases and one-sided information on
liability favoring the defendant) all lead to precisely the same comparative statics predictions as those we tested.
Finally, even under an alternative parameterization where our comparative
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statics would change, the empirical result may persist. In particular, virtually
every parameterization of the judgment function would result in some type of
selection eﬀect in litigated cases. Only in the case of the private information
model would this eﬀect be equal to zero. Thus, even if an alternative parameterization of the information model were to produce the opposite comparative
static prediction, the results reported in Table 4 are not signiÞcantly diﬀerent
from zero. As such, only in the special case where the information model predicts no eﬀect whatsoever would our empirical inquiry lose its ability to discern
between the two models.
4.4.3

Ex Ante Behavior

Finally, our parameterization has not considered the eﬀect that MICRA may
have had on ex ante behavior by defendants. If responded to the dampening
in expected exposure introduced by the damages cap, then the distribution of
defendant ‘types’ would likely not be held constant in the pre- and post-MICRA
worlds. Failure to account for this endogeneity, one might argue, might skew
our predictions. (See, e.g., Bernardo, Talley & Welch (2000); Zeiler (2002)).
If the endogeneity of ex ante behavior were suﬃciently strong, it might cause
us to reject erroneously the information model. Indeed, it is conceivable that
potential medical malpractice defendants began to act more carelessly after the
passage of MICRA, anticipating a smaller liability exposure. Consequently,
of the universe of cases Þled after MICRA, there are more defendants with
objectively ‘weak’ cases than before passage of the Act, pushing expected win
rates up. This eﬀect works against the direct eﬀect of reducing win rates that our
pure information model generated. Consequently, we cannot unambiguously
reject the possibility that ex ante behavioral adjustments might be working in
conjunction with an information model. We conjecture, however, that it would
be rather surprising if these eﬀects cancelled one another out exactly.

5

Conclusion

This paper has presented a model of pre-trial settlement behavior that integrates
two competing strands of the literature, private information and self-serving biases (or “optimism”). Focusing on the bargaining outcomes that are supported
by direct revelation mechanisms characterized the selection of jury trials allowing for a two-sided asymmetric information and general forms of cognitive
biases. Our model not only provides a more general framework for studying
the bargaining process in the civil justice system, it can also be used to generate testable hypotheses about how characteristics of the cases that go to trial
respond to exogenous shocks in the underlying parameters of the model.
With a relatively straightforward parameterization, we are able to construct
a direct test of the two competing models of settlement behavior. Under this
parameterization, the information model predicts that plaintiﬀ win rates should
rise in response to a decrease in expected damage awards. The optimism model,
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however, predicts that win rates should be unchanged in response to a shock to
expected damages. We used data on civil jury verdicts in California and Illinois
before and after the passage of a noneconomic damage cap in California to test
whether or not win rates rose, as would be predicted by the information model.
We found no signiÞcant eﬀect of the damage cap on win rates, providing implicit
support for the optimism model of settlement behavior. While the sample sizes
we use may be too small to estimate the eﬀect of MICRA precisely enough to
rule out the information model completely, our results ultimately oﬀer it little
support.
In many respects, this paper is but the tip of the iceberg in suggesting possible avenues for future research. A great deal of empirical work needs to be
done before we can deÞnitely answer which model of settlement behavior best
Þts existing data. For example, in addition to malpractice reforms, many jurisdictions within our data set implemented mandatory, non-binding arbitration
for various lower stakes cases. Such reforms may be interpreted as an attempt
to de-bias the potential litigants and encourage settlement. Our parameterized model would be capable of predicting diﬀerential eﬀects of such reforms in
comparing the pure version of either model against a hybrid model of behavior.
We expect to incorporate this analysis into the existing framework in a future
draft. Nonetheless, at the very least the approach presented here provides
both a fruitful framework for formulating predictions, and a helpful empirical
approach for uncovering the dynamics of settlement – by focusing not at cases
that actually settle, but rather at cases that fail to do so.
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7

Appendix

This Appendix presents a number of the derivations and proofs omitted in
Sections 2 and 3 of the paper.

7.1

Derivation of the Parties’ Net Payoﬀ Functions:

Consider Þrst the derivation of the parties’ net payoﬀ functions given in expressions (3) and (4) in the text. If one thinks of settlement as a type of dummy
indicator variable, k, which equals one when and only when settlement succeeds,
then k is distributed Bernoulli with success/fail parameters (p, 1 − p) .When settlement fails (i.e., when k = 0), the parties will end up in court. In such a circumstance, the parties will Bayesian update their expectations of the expected
judgment. In particular, the plaintiﬀ whose type is x and who has reported ξ
updates her assessment of the expected litigation payoﬀ to be
(25)
Ey {J (x, y) + επ (x, y) − cπ |x, ξ, k = 0}
µ
¶
Z y
Pr {k = 0|x, ξ, y} · g (y|x, ξ)
(J (x, y) + επ (x, y) − cπ )
=
dy
Pr (k = 0|x, ξ)
y
Ry
(J (x, y) + επ (x, y) − cπ ) (1 − p (ξ, y)) · g (y) dy
y
=
Ey {1 − p (ξ, y)}
Ey {J (x, y) + επ (x, y) − cπ (1 − p (ξ, y))}
=
Ey {1 − p (ξ, y)}

For the plaintiﬀ,then, the expected net gain from participation is therefore:

(26)
rπ (ξ|x) = Ey {p (ξ, y) · t (ξ, y)}
π
+Ey {(1 − p (ξ, y)) |x, ξ} · Ey {J (x, y) + ε (x, y) − cπ |x, ξ, k = 0}
−Ey {J (x, y) + επ (x, y) − cπ }
= Ey {p (ξ, y) t (ξ, y) + (1 − p (ξ, y)) (J (x, y) + επ (x, y) − cπ ) − (J (x, y) + επ (x, y)) − cπ }
This is the expression given in the text. An identical approach applies to the
defendant.¥

7.2

Proof of Lemma 1

From Guesnerie and Laﬀont (1984), for players π and ∆ who report (respectively) ξ and θ, and whose expected payoﬀs are (respectively) rπ (ξ|x) and
r∆ (θ|y) ,incentive compatability implies that.
¯
¯
(ξ|x) ¯
(θ|y) ¯
0
r∆
(y|y) = ∂r∆∂y
rπ0 (x|x) = ∂rπ∂x
¯
¯
ξ=x
θ=y
¯
¯
2
2
rπ (ξ|x) ¯
∆ (θ|y) ¯
00
rπ00 (x|x) = ∂ ∂ξ∂x
≥ 0 r∆
(y|y) = ∂ r∂θ∂y
≥0
¯
¯
ξ=x

θ=y

Imposing the deÞnitions of rπ (ξ|x) and r∆ (θ|y) from the text produces the
conditions that appear in the Lemma.¥
30

7.3

Proof of Lemma 2

Taking expectations of the expression in (9) over x yields the plaintiﬀ’s ex ante
expected gain:

Ex {rπ (x)} = rπ (x) +
= rπ (x) +
= rπ (x) +

Z

x

x
Z x
x
Z x
x

Z

x

x
Z ξ
x

Ey {p (ξ, y) · (J1 (ξ, y) + επ1 (x, y))} dξdF (27)
(x)
Ey {p (ξ, y) · (J1 (ξ, y) + επ1 (x, y))} dF (x) dξ

Ey {p (ξ, y) · (J1 (ξ, y) + επ1 (x, y))} · F (ξ) · dξ
½

= rπ (x) + Ex,y p (x, y) · (J1 (ξ, y) + επ1 (x, y)) ·

µ

F (x)
f (x)

¶¾

Similarly, Taking expectations of (9) over y yields the plaintiﬀ’s ex ante
expected payoﬀ:

Ey {r∆ (y)} = r∆ (y) +

Z

y

y

Z

y

y

Ex {p (x, θ) · (−J2 (x, θ) + ε∆2 (x, y))} dθdG(28)
(y)

½
¾
G (θ)
= r∆ (y) + Exy p (x, θ) · (−J2 (x, θ) + ε∆2 (x, y)) ·
g (θ)

Summing these expected payoﬀs yeilds:
(29)
Exy {rπ + r∆ } = rπ (x) + r∆ (y)
µ
µ
½
·
¶
¶¸¾
F (x)
G (y)
+Ex,y p (x, y) (J1 (ξ, y) + επ1 (x, y))
+ (−J2 (x, y) + ε∆2 (x, y))
f (x)
g (y)
But from (6), we know also that
Ex {rπ (x)} + Ey {r∆ (y)} = Ex,y {p (x, y) ((cπ + c∆ ) − (επ (x, y) + ε∆ (x, y)))}
Combining the two above expressions therefore yields:
rπ (x) + r∆ (y)
(
"

= Ex,y

p (x, y)

(cπ + c∆³) − (ε´π (x, y) + ε∆ (x, y))
´
³
(x)
+ (−J2 (x, y) + ε∆2 (x, y)) · G(y)
− (J1 (ξ, y) + επ1 (x, y)) · Ff (x)
g(y)

≡ Ex,y {p (x, y) · φ (x, y, cπ , c∆ , επ , ε∆ )}

Noting that a necessary (and with appropriate transfers, suﬃcient) condition
for an IC/IR mechanism is that rπ (x) + r∆ (y) ≥ 0, we arrive at the expression
given in the lemma.¥
[To Be Completed]
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